College Athletics: Money, Greed, and the Failure of University Leadership
When professional football has better financial discipline than America’s universities, who is protecting education?
The Forgotten Purpose of a University
When did American universities decide that winning football championships was as important as educating students? University athletics once offered scholarships and an opportunity to compete while earning a degree. Now the most prominent football programs operate within a multibillion-dollar commercial ecosystem of media contracts, lucrative coaching deals, donor-backed opportunities, and increasingly direct athlete compensation.
Athletes did not invent this marketplace. University presidents, athletic directors, conferences, and governing boards expanded it long before athletes gained meaningful commercial rights. The crisis is not simply that athletes want to be paid; it is that universities commercialized athletics without constructing a durable framework for managing the consequences.
The $50 Million Football Team
In termiNIL’s August 2026 model, Oregon’s roster was valued at approximately $51.7 million, Texas at $49.8 million, and Ohio State at $48.8 million. These are modeled commercial values, not verified payrolls, NIL payments, or actual university spending. Nevertheless, the estimates demonstrate the scale of the marketplace in which universities now compete for talent.
The fifteen highest-valued rosters displayed in the published model total approximately $667.7 million in modeled player value; this is not an audited measure of actual university expenditure. A roster valuation cannot tell us what an institution paid, but it can raise a legitimate question: how much financial advantage does a university seek in the name of athletic success, and what is the educational return?
The Top 15 Modeled Rosters Versus the AP Poll
The following comparison pairs the fifteen roster valuations published by termiNIL for August 2026 with the October 25, 2026 AP Top 25 snapshot. An unranked team is not necessarily unsuccessful, and a midseason poll does not establish a season’s final results. The comparison tests whether estimated talent value and contemporaneous performance move together—not whether a university wasted a specific amount of money.
| Value rank | University | Modeled value | AP rank |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Oregon | $51.7M | — |
| 2 | Texas | $49.8M | 11 |
| 3 | Ohio State | $48.8M | 2 |
| 4 | Notre Dame | $46.8M | 5 |
| 5 | Georgia | $46.6M | 3 |
| 6 | Texas A&M | $46.2M | — |
| 7 | Alabama | $45.5M | 10 |
| 8 | Ole Miss | $44.4M | 12 |
| 9 | Miami | $44.2M | 1 |
| 10 | Oklahoma | $41.5M | — |
| 11 | LSU | $41.4M | 15 |
| 12 | Indiana | $41.0M | 4 |
| 13 | Texas Tech | $40.6M | 13 |
| 14 | Michigan | $40.5M | — |
| 15 | Auburn | $38.7M | — |
Source note: The roster valuations come from termiNIL’s model published August 19, 2026, using data as of August 3. Rankings are from the Associated Press Top 25 released October 25, 2026. This is a historical snapshot, not a current ranking. Modeled roster valuations are estimates of player market value, not verified compensation, NIL payments, or university expenditures. A dash indicates a team outside the October 25 AP Top 25.
Oregon led the modeled value table yet was outside the cited poll. Miami stood ninth in modeled value and first in the poll. UCLA was seventh in the poll, but its August modeled roster valuation is not included in the publicly displayed top-fifteen source table. The lesson is not that money is irrelevant: resources help attract talent. It is that coaching, development, preparation, discipline, and teamwork remain indispensable—and that the largest modeled roster is not automatically the best-ranked team.
The NFL Has a Draft. Professional Soccer Has Transfers. Universities Have a Bidding War.
Perhaps the greatest irony in American college athletics is that professional sports have developed more structured systems for acquiring and retaining talent than universities whose primary mission is education.
The NFL has a draft. When a franchise selects an eligible college player, it does not pay the player's university a transfer fee or purchase his draft rights from another franchise. The draft allocates exclusive negotiating rights, and the player subsequently signs a professional contract under collectively bargained rookie compensation rules. The player gets paid; the franchise does not pay an acquisition fee to the university that developed him.
Professional soccer operates differently. A club acquiring a player under contract may pay a transfer fee to the releasing club. That fee purchases contractual registration rights, not ownership of a person. The player's consent and contractual rights remain important.
College football has developed a third model. Universities compete to attract and retain athletes through scholarships, direct compensation, NIL opportunities, and other permitted financial benefits. Wealthy supporters and commercial partners can strengthen those offers. In economic terms, universities invest in acquiring and developing athletic talent, although their payments to athletes are not equivalent to interclub transfer fees.
Imagine a university recruiting a promising quarterback, providing education, coaching, medical care, facilities, and years of development. A competing institution then offers a more attractive athletic and financial opportunity. The athlete transfers. The first university generally receives no transfer fee or development compensation for its investment.
That is an unusual economic arrangement: institutions can spend heavily on developing human capital without securing a lasting return. Yet athletes also have legitimate rights to educational choice, career mobility, and lawful compensation. A university's investment does not make a student its property.
NFL players also retain opportunities for independent endorsements and personal marketing, subject to contractual restrictions. The NFL distinguishes the allocation of incoming talent, compensation under collective bargaining, and personal commercial rights. College athletics has increasingly intertwined recruiting, compensation, and NIL.
Universities cannot simply copy an NFL draft or impose soccer-style transfer fees. Such measures raise serious questions about student choice, labor rights, and antitrust law. But the absence of an easy legal solution does not absolve university leaders of the responsibility to design a financially sustainable framework.
If a university invests millions recruiting and developing talent only to lose that talent to a wealthier competitor, who bears the cost and who receives the return? Should a lawful system recognize player development costs, or should the most commercial programs operate under clearer contractual and financial structures?
The NFL has a draft. Professional soccer has a transfer market. College football has a bidding war—and university presidents are asking Congress to help them manage it.
When Money Replaces Academic Merit
A student-athlete should be able to choose a university for its academic programs, campus life, coaching, and future opportunities. Compensation can reasonably be part of that choice. The danger arises when commercial value becomes the primary recruiting criterion for the university and the primary selection criterion for the student. Many athletes remain serious students; the criticism is directed at the incentives of the system, not at every individual athlete.
Return on Investment—or the Me-Me Culture?
Athletes seek compensation, coaches seek contracts, conferences seek broadcasting revenue, lawyers seek fees, and universities seek victories and prestige. Each has a rationale. But who measures the return to education? A scholarship, housing, academic support, medical care, and access to a university community already represent meaningful value. Those benefits do not extinguish athletes’ commercial rights; they do remind us what the institution is supposed to provide.
If universities want to behave as commercial enterprises, their boards should disclose objectives, costs, risks, and results with the rigor expected of a business. And if they want to defend education as their primary purpose, that purpose must influence how they spend.
The Architects of Their Own Crisis
Former NCAA president Mark Emmert oversaw years in which commercial revenue expanded even as the NCAA defended restrictive amateurism rules. His successor, Charlie Baker, inherited major legal and structural problems. Conference leaders including the SEC’s Greg Sankey and Big Ten’s Tony Petitti operate within an increasingly lucrative media marketplace. Responsibility is not identical across individuals or eras, but the institutional question remains: where were the presidents and boards when spending and legal exposure grew?
Universities cannot claim the benefits of commercial success while treating its financial and legal consequences as someone else’s problem.
Lawyers, Courts, and the Price of Reform
The litigation associated with Ed O’Bannon, and later the House v. NCAA settlement led by attorneys including Jeffrey Kessler and Steve Berman, challenged real legal restrictions. Judge Claudia Wilken’s role was to evaluate the settlement under the law—not to design an operating model for higher education. The House settlement involved approximately $2.8 billion in historical damages, alongside a restructuring of athlete compensation. Attorneys sought fees subject to judicial review; no specific fee award is asserted here without the operative court order.
Litigation can expose unlawful rules and produce remedies. It cannot substitute for leadership, budgeting, or educational governance. The lawyers may win the case; the universities must operate the resulting system.
Broadcasting Revenue and the Other Sports
Media revenue has helped finance more than football: scholarships, women’s sports, travel, medical support, facilities, and programs that do not generate large audiences. Some expenditures have been extravagant, but the underlying cross-subsidy matters. As compensation and football-related costs grow, presidents must explain how they will preserve educational opportunities in less commercial sports.
The House settlement included broadcast-related NIL claims. It did not mean that every athlete personally owned the university’s television contract. The broader issue is who benefits from commercial revenue and who bears the tradeoffs.
Politicians, Congress, and Accountability
California’s 2019 Fair Pay to Play Act, advanced by lawmakers Nancy Skinner and Steven Bradford and signed by Governor Gavin Newsom, helped accelerate changes in athletes’ commercial rights. The law did not create the entire NIL economy; courts, universities, conferences, businesses, and other states also shaped it. Reform addressed a genuine inequity without supplying a complete nationwide governance model.
Congress can legitimately consider uniform interstate standards and legal clarity. But national legislation should not become a substitute for financial discipline. University leaders routinely defend institutional autonomy; they must also accept responsibility for the commercial decisions made under that autonomy.
Education or Professional Entertainment?
A professional sports enterprise exists to compete, entertain, and generate commercial value. A university exists to educate, conduct research, and develop capable citizens. Those purposes can coexist, but only if the institution acknowledges the difference. For the most commercial football programs, clearer financial separation and reporting may deserve serious consideration, with careful protection for academics and other sports.
Final Verdict: Money Cannot Buy the Final Score
NIL did not create wealthy boosters. It gave athletes lawful ways to monetize their identities and brought more financial activity into the open, while leaving important questions about recruiting inducements and institutional compensation. A university’s estimated roster value is not a verified spending total, and a poll is not a balance sheet. Yet the contrast between financial rankings and on-field results exposes the limits of buying talent.
Professional football has collectively negotiated rules and still allows its players to pursue personal endorsements. Universities have expanded the financial competition for players while struggling to build equally coherent governance. Presidents and trustees cannot defend independence while asking Congress to protect them from every consequence of their decisions.
The purpose of higher education is not to win a bidding war. It is to educate. Athletics can enrich that mission, but it should not displace it. Financial resources matter; so do leadership, teamwork, preparation, and accountability.
The boosters have been legitimized, the players have been priced, and the universities have entered the bidding war—but the game is still played on the field.
White Creek Opinion
Source note: The roster valuations come from termiNIL’s model published August 19, 2026, using data as of August 3. Rankings are from the Associated Press Top 25 released October 25, 2026. This is a historical snapshot, not a current ranking. Modeled roster valuations are estimates of player market value, not verified compensation, NIL payments, or university expenditures. A dash indicates a team outside the October 25 AP Top 25.
Source Record and Verification Notes
termiNIL, “College Football Roster Value Rankings,” https://www.terminil.com/blog/college-football-roster-value-rankings(modeled values; not actual spending).
Associated Press Top 25, October 25, 2026 (through games October 24), archived at https://www.ncaa.com/rankings/football/fbs/associated-press.
NCAA, House v. NCAA settlement announcements and court approval, June 2025. Historical damages are approximately $2.78 billion; no attorney-fee award is asserted here.
NFL Football Operations, rookie contract and draft rules: https://operations.nfl.com/; NFL–NFLPA collective bargaining agreement. Transfer-fee comparison describes professional soccer, not college-player ownership.
California SB 206 (2019), Fair Pay to Play Act, legislative record.
Continue reading
Enter your email to read the rest of this article.










